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The Clean Power Plan:
Testing the Limits of Administrative Law and the Electric Grid
-- GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. – (forthcoming 2016)
Emily Hammond* & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.**
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) is one of
the most controversial and highest-stake rule ever issued by any agency. 1 Released in final form
on August 4, 2015,2 the rule is aimed at existing electric power plants and establishes carbon
dioxide emission reduction requirements for states. EPA projects that if each state meets its
target, emissions would be about twenty percent less than 2012 levels by 2030.3 Proponents of
the rule maintain that it is essential to mitigating the potentially devastating effects of climate
change.4 Opponents, by contrast, argue that it is unlikely to be effective for its intended purpose
and that it jeopardizes the reliability of the electricity grid and the wellbeing of the U.S.

* Associate Dean for Public Engagement and Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
** Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, the George Washington University Law School. The authors thank Ann
Carlson, Joel Eisen, Rob Glicksman, and members of the PUC Clean Energy Collaborative workshop for their
helpful comments.
1
There are arguably several metrics along which the CPP might qualify: impact on utilities (compliance costs from
$1.4 to 8.4 billion annually); climate benefits ($20 billion by 2030); or expansive interpretation of statutory authority.
See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, ES-9-10, ES-20 (Aug. 2015) (presenting
these figures, additional data, and assumptions). A coal-industry funded study, by contrast, puts the annual energy
sector costs at $29-39 billion and estimates costs to the U.S. economy ranging from $64-79 billion from 2022-2033.
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, ENERGY AND CONSUMER IMPACTS OF EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN 5 (Nov. 7, 2015). On
the final point regarding statutory authority, see infra for our argument that EPA has jurisdictional authority to issue
the CPP.
2
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,661–65,120 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter CPP] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
3
This is a projection, not a requirement. Further, the widely reported “requirement” of a 32% reduction below 2005
levels is based on the same projection but extrapolated to 2005 because 2005 is the year of reference for many of the
United States’s international commitments. See Nathan Richardson, 2005 v .2012 in EPA’s Proposal, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, June 4, 2014, http://common-resources.org/blog/2014/2005-vs-2012-epas-proposal (explaining
common misperceptions regarding the requirements and dates).
4
Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Plan, Aug. 3, 2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan (calling CPP “single most important step
America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change”).
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economy.5 We are in the awkward position of agreeing with both the proponents and the
opponents of the CPP. We want the rule to succeed in accomplishing its intended purpose but
we fear it may have serious unintended adverse effects on the performance of the U.S. electricity
grid and the economics of the power sector. Further, we have serious concerns about the ability
of administrative law doctrine to manage the litigation that is to come.6
To frame our discussion, we here offer a few observations on the scope of the Agency
action at issue.7 The CPP has been the subject of intense study and controversy since its
proposal in 2014. After eliciting 4.3 million comments, EPA published the final rule along with
a statement of basis and purpose that is over 1500 pages long.8 The Agency’s accompanying
regulatory impact analysis, technical support, and legal documents span nearly 1000 more.9 The
many controversial substantive decisions and policy decisions embodied in the CPP are matched
only by the intense debate whether the supporting legal bases are lawful. For example, the CPP
unapologetically picks winners and losers among electricity fuels; most prominently, it favors
natural gas and renewables over coal.10 This choice—which targets the largest source of

5

Nicolas Loris, Four Big Problems with the Obama Administration’s Climate Change Regulations, HERITAGE.ORG,
Aug. 14, 2015 (“The climate impact of the Clean Power Plan will be meaningless.”); Scott Segal, Lots of Pain with
Questionable Benefits, U.S. NEWS DEBATE CLUB, Aug. 5, 2015 (“We can expect significant potential threat to the
electric reliability upon which our modern way of life depends.”).
6
Cf. In re W.V., Emergency Pet’n for Extraordinary Writ, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015) (seeking
emergency stay of CPP prior to rule’s publication in Federal Register); cf. In re Murray Energy, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (denying petition for writ of prohibition to stop EPA from issuing final rule).
7
See also infra Part I (describing major attributes of CPP).
8
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A)-(C) (mandating that statement of basis and
purpose include factual data, methodology, and legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying rules).
This elaboration is distinct from that of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“concise statement of basis and purpose”), but
it tracks the courts’ interpretation of the APA. Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1732 (2011); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III,
IV, and V? A Response to Beerman and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 920 (2007) (“the most important
factor that explains the length of informal rulemakings is hard-look review”).
9
EPA, CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-planexisting-power-plants (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (providing links and page information).
10
See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,667 (listing building block 2 as “[s]ubstituting increased generation from loweremitting existing natural gas combined cycle units for reduced generation from higher-emitting affected steam
generating units”).
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baseload power in the United States11—has attracted fierce opposition from the coal industry and
legislators from coal states such as West Virginia, Kentucky, Wyoming, and North Dakota.12 On
the other hand, states that have already taken significant steps toward reducing coal-fired power
and increasing the use of natural gas and renewables—like California,13—are on on-track for
compliance without needing to make any major changes.
From a legal standpoint, most of the arguments center on whether EPA has jurisdiction to
promulgate the CPP. The agency’s basis is section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). As we
briefly discuss below, two competing versions of that section are published in the Statutes At
Large, and they point in opposite jurisdictional directions.14 Moreover, whether EPA may
regulate “beyond the fence line” of individual power plants and focus on the electricity system as
a whole is a hotly contested matter of statutory interpretation.15 Other issues include whether the
many interstitial interpretive and policymaking decisions within the CPP would survive judicial
scrutiny. And the legality of EPA’s simultaneously issued regulations for new and modified
power plants, which are a legal predicate to the CPP itself, are also a matter of debate.16
The purpose of this article is not simply to repeat the already well-developed, rigorous
debate that adheres to each policy and legal choice embodied in the CPP.17 Rather, we discuss
four issues that are raised by the CPP but that have not yet attracted the attention and analysis
11

EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, ELECTRICITY GENERATION, Fig. 31 (Apr. 14, 2015).
In re W.V., No. 15-1277.
13
Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Statement on President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3,
2015).
14
Compare Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990) (Senate amendment), with Pub. L. No. 101549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990) (House amendment). See also CPP, supra note 2, at 64,711–12 (noting
differences); infra Part ___ (discussing this issue).
15
See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,760 (discussing interpretation of “system of emissions reduction” and beyond-thefence line comments); infra Part II.C. (discussing this issue).
16
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, -- Fed. Reg. –, at 16 (Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter NSPS].
17
Compare, e.g., William W. Buzbee et al., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO
WATCH, Issue Alert No. 1506 (Aug. 2015) (largely arguing for upholding CPP on each policy and legal issue), with
Nicolas D. Loris, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE MANY PROBLEMS OF EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN AND REGULATIONS:
A PRIMER, No. 3025 (July 15, 2015) (largely arguing for vacating the CPP on each policy and legal issue).
12
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they deserve. After summarizing the main elements of the CPP, we consider: (1) the
administrative law issues related to whether and to what extent reviewing courts should defer to
the EPA’s two statutory interpretations that provide the jurisdictional basis for the CPP; (2) what
remedy a court should provide at various procedural postures if it detects or believes likely a
fatal error in the CPP or the process through which it was issued; (3) the implementation
challenges associated with the intermittent nature of the electricity supplies that EPA expects
utilities to substitute for the fossil fuels that now provide most of the nation’s electricity; and (4)
the implementation challenges associated with the risk that some of the most promising
approaches for state compliance may be preempted by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). The first
two issues are not unique to the CPP. These issues create serious problems whenever a court is
called upon to review a major agency rule, but they are particularly pronounced with respect to
the CPP. The third and fourth issues are among the most serious obstacles to successfully
implementing the CPP.
I.

A Brief Overview of the Clean Power Plan
It is now broadly accepted that the world is experiencing major changes in climate, the

causes of these changes are anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, and, unmitigated,
these changes will be catastrophic for billions of people, human health, and the environment.18
Indeed, climate effects are already observable and inevitable, but mitigating these effects by
reducing GHG emissions is a critical component of both domestic and international climate
policy.19 Greenhouse gases include several compounds;20 carbon dioxide (“CO2”) is the focus of
18

See generally Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gasses Under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,523 (Dec. 15, 2009) (determining that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public
health and welfare).
19
As is adaptation. Some of the considerations we raise in Part III.A., infra, are also relevant to adaptation to the
extent they relate to grid resiliency.
20
Id. at 66,497 (including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride in endangerment finding).
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the CPP.21 Any electricity source that burns fossil fuels emits CO2; the amount of emissions is a
function of the efficiency of the combustion process and the amount of carbon in the fuel
source.22 Further, there is not at present any economically viable technology-based method
(such as a scrubber for example) of reducing emissions of CO2 from combustion of any carbonbased fuel at existing sources.23 Thus, the only currently viable way to reduce GHG emissions
from fossil-fueled power—which accounts for over thirty-eight percent of U.S. GHG
emissions24—is to improve efficiency or switch fuels to lower- or zero-carbon sources.25 This
point is critical for understanding the CPP’s approach, as shown below.
Though complicated in its details, we can summarize easily the features of the CPP that
are important for our purposes. The rule relies on the cooperative federalism structure familiar to
major federal environmental statutes.26 Once EPA sets new source performance standards for a
given pollutant found to endanger public health or welfare under section 111(b) of the CAA, the
states are required to develop implementation plans to reduce emissions of that pollutant from
existing sources under section 111(d).27 The CPP fits into this scheme by providing the emission
guidelines and “best system of emissions reduction” (“BSER”) that states must meet in their
21

EPA explains that CO2 accounts for 82% of U.S. GHG emissions. CPP, supra note 2, at 64,677.
Because our focus is on regulation of fossil-fueled power under the CPP, we do not engage the literature on
lifecycle carbon emissions for each electricity source. E.g., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Fact Sheet, Life-Cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electricity Generation, at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57187.pdf (last
visited Oct. 9, 2015) (summarizing methodology and results of Life Cycle Assessment Harmonization Project).
23
See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,690 (“CO2’s huge quantities and lack of reactivity make it challenging to remove
from a smokestack.”).
24
Id. at 134.
25
In its new source performance standards for new electricity generating units, EPA contemplates that new coalfired plants will incorporate high-efficiency super-critical pulverized coal utility boilers with partial carbon capture
and sequestration (CCS). NSPS, supra note 16, at 16. As an alternative, the agency will permit co-firing with
natural gas. Id. at 17. Further, EPA suggests that market conditions are such that coal-fired plants are unlikely to be
built in the future, but if they are, the NSPS will encourage research and development of CCS. Id. at 17-19. Overall,
the agency appears to go out of its way to provide alternatives to CCS in light of its limited current use, its expense,
the geological needs of the technology, and its potential water-use and water-quality implications. E.g., id. at 150,
159, 252-56.
26
See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from
the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 330-31 (2013) (providing overview of cooperative federalism
structure and collecting sources).
27
We discuss the legal issues surrounding this scheme infra Part II.B.
22
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plans.28 EPA gives states considerable flexibility with respect to their methods of
implementation. Thus, they may adopt source-specific requirements, engage in coordinated
efforts with other states, develop mass-based trading programs, and/or incorporate other state
policy measures, like conservation and efficiency, into their approaches.29
EPA’s methodology and assumptions in setting the state goals and BSER are of particular
interest for purposes of our analysis below. BSER consists of three building blocks. The first
block assumes heat efficiency improvements at coal-fired electric generating units (“EGUs”) in
the 2.1 to 4.3 percent range.30 The second block relies on fuel switching by EGUs from coal to
natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) units, which are the most efficient of natural gas units and
emit slightly more than one-third of the CO2 of conventional coal-fired units on a mass-perMWh basis.31 The third building block relies on fuel-switching by EGUs from fossil fuels to new
zero-emitting renewable generation—primarily wind and solar.32 After calculating BSER
reductions on a regional basis, EPA applied those expectations to each state’s electricity fuel mix
to develop state-specific goals. EPA emphasized that the building blocks “are available to all
affected EGUs, either through direct investment or operational shifts” or through emissions
trading.33 States need not require EGUs to apply the building blocks; they may take other
actions toward meeting state emission reduction plans, which can include credit trading, new
nuclear construction, and demand-side and efficiency programs.34 However, even if states do not
precisely adopt BSER, the general concepts of substituting natural gas for coal, and renewables

28

See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,669–74. We discuss the issues surrounding BSER infra Part II.C.
E.g., CPP, supra note 2, at 64,672–74.
30
Id. at 64,789.
31
See EPA, CO2 Emission Performance Rate and Goal Computation Technical Support Document for CPP Final
Rule 11 Tbl. 4 (Aug. 2015) (showing emission rates for sources in Eastern Interconnection).
32
CPP, supra note 2, at 64,807 (also listing geothermal and hydropower).
33
CPP, supra note 2, at 64,667.
34
Id.
29
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for fossil fuels, are expected to play key roles in CPP compliance.35 In the next sections, we first
consider EPA’s authority to issue the CPP at all; the three issues we consider thereafter relate to
the second and third building blocks.
II.

Administrative Law and the Clean Power Plan
Even prior to EPA’s issuance of the final CPP—and its publication in the Federal

Register—various opponents of the CPP have sought stays from the D.C. Circuit.36 And
although that court has not as of this writing considered the merits of the CPP, the dispute is so
important that the Supreme Court is virtually certain to play a role in the review process. Of
course, judicial review is an ordinary feature of major rulemakings.37 A typology of potential
defects is set out in the CAA itself38 and parallels the scope-of-review provisions in section 706
of the APA.39 We expect the petitioners to make the two most frequent objections to the legality
of any rule: (1) that it is in excess of statutory jurisdiction;40 and that it is (2) arbitrary and
capricious41 because the Agency did not explain adequately (a) its critical policy choices
underlying the rule; and/or (b) its responses to comments that raised well-supported questions
about the practicality and wisdom of the rule.42 In Part A below, we offer our observations only
with respect to the largest issues involving statutory jurisdiction. In Part B below, we consider
the matter of remedies as the issue relates to both statutory authority and the arbitrary and
capricious standard.
35

For projections of the future electricity fuel mix under various scenarios, see EIA, Under proposed Clean Power
Plan, natural gas, then renewables, gain generation share, May 27, 2015, at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21392.
36
See discussion supra at Part II.C.1
37
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing grounds for judicial review). As discussed infra Part II.B., would-be petitioners
must satisfy a variety of reviewability requirements.
38
42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9).
39
The parallel APA and CAA provisions are interpreted as having the same meaning. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d
1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
40
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); see generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, Jr., I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch. 3 (5th ed.
2010).
41
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
42
See generally PIERCE, supra note 40, at 593-94.
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First, however, we note that the wisdom of the administrative law doctrine surrounding
these grounds for judicial reversal is the subject of enduring debates. There is evidence that
agencies have so internalized the court-imposed requirements of administrative law doctrine43
that—depending on whom one asks—agencies are either hopelessly ossified44 or demonstrably
democratic.45 Layered over these concerns is a broader challenge of administrative law—
managing the reliance interests of regulated parties and statutory beneficiaries while
accommodating separation-of-powers concerns. Any time an agency issues a rule that requires
major changes of the regulated community, that community is faced with potentially enormous
expenditures. If regulated entities undertake those expenditures while a rule is being challenged,
what are they to do if the rule is ultimately vacated? And if they do not undertake those
expenditures, what of the public benefits that were not realized before the rule was ultimately
upheld? Whether or not (or whenever) a court intervenes, it will also be mindful of its place in
the constitutional structure—both ensuring the agency stays within its jurisdictional boundaries
and deferring to the agency’s expertise and place within the executive branch.
Second, we emphasize that we do not attempt here to set forth all the legal arguments that
will surely be briefed, nor is our focus on the debate regarding the wisdom of administrative law
doctrine. Instead, we argue that the CPP strains the limits of administrative law itself. This
concern is best illustrated by two issues: judicial review of EPA’s interpretation of the CAA;
and the relationship between procedural postures, remedies, and reliance.
A.

Statutory Authority for the CPP

43

See generally Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015)
(describing results of empirical study of agency drafters’ perceptions of administrative law doctrine).
44
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995).
45
Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 355 (2013).
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There are two critical interpretive issues related to EPA’s statutory authority to
promulgate the CPP. The first—commonly called the section 112 exemption issue—relates to
EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from EGUs at all. The second—commonly called the
beyond-the-fence-line issue—relates to how EPA determines what constitutes BSER (which is
the premise upon which the entire CPP is based). This section briefly reviews the issues before
considering the applicable administrative law.
First, EPA’s authority for the CPP comes from section 111(d) of the CAA. This
provision contemplates emission standards for existing sources, and cross-references section 112.
Section 112 governs air toxics, and the cross-reference creates an exclusion from regulation
under section 111(d).46 What exactly constitutes the exclusion is unclear because when Congress
amended section 111 in 1990, it made a serious error. It enacted two different versions of the
exclusion. The House version of the amendment seems to preclude any regulation of a source
category under section 111(d) if EPA already regulates that source category under section 112.47
The Senate version, by contrast, appears to exclude from section 111(d)’s reach only pollutants
already regulated under section 112.48 In 1995, when EPA first had occasion to consider this
discrepancy, it concluded that it was required to give effect to the House version and could not
regulate sources already regulated under section 112.49 In the statement of the basis and purpose

46

41 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990). At the time the CPP was promulgated, EPA regulated
EGUs’ toxic air emissions under §112 (the “MATS rule”). Although the Supreme Court held unreasonable EPA’s
interpretation of § 112 as precluding cost considerations in deciding whether to regulate, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699 (2015), the rule had not been stayed pending litigation. The D.C. Circuit has not yet determined whether to
remand with vacatur, but Chenery v. SEC (Chenery I) ought to require any analysis to be based on the agency’s
reasoning at the time it made its decision; here, the CPP was predicated on the MATS rule’s presence. See also
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (insisting on adhering to Chenery notwithstanding presence of other cost-benefit
information in the record). Thus, even if the D.C. Circuit vacates the MATS rule, that decision ought not moot the §
112 exclusion issue here. See also CPP, supra note [1], at 64,697 (“[T]he MATS rule remains in place at this
time.”).
48
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990).
49
EPA, Air Emissions from Municipal Solid Waste Landfills—Background Information for Final Standards and
Guidelines, Pub. No. EPA-453/R-94-021, at 5-6, available at www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/landfill/bidfl.pdf; see also
47
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of the CPP, however, EPA decided that its prior interpretation of the section 112 exclusion was
wrong.50 The Agency concluded that the House version is ambiguous, and the best resolution of
the two versions is “the [s]ection 112 Exclusion does not bar the regulation under [section 111(d)]
of non-HAP [hazardous air pollutants] from a source category, regardless of whether that source
category is subject to standards for HAP under CAA section 112.”51 Parties that challenge the
validity of the CPP will argue EPA’s initial interpretation of section112 was correct and that its
new interpretation is erroneous.
The next statutory argument petitioners will make is that the second and third building
blocks of the CPP are beyond EPA’s power to implement section 111(d). As mentioned above,
section 111(d) provides that EPA must issue regulations under which states establish “standards
of performance.”52 That phrase is defined as:
[A] standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.53
The key legal argument here is that the massive fuel switching envisioned by the CPP does not
qualify as a “standard.”54 Traditionally, EPA has established technology-based standards that
require emission reductions at individual sources. EPA’s new source performance standards for
CO2 illustrate that approach.55 The Agency set an emission rate for CO2 at new coal-fired power

Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from the
Section 112)(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 16,031 (Mar. 29, 2005) (reaching same interpretation), held arbitrary and
capricious on other grounds, New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
50
CPP, supra note 2, at 64,710–11.
51
CPP, supra note 2, at 64,711.
52
41 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
53
Id. § 7411(a)(1) (emphasis added).
54
Petitioners might also contend that EPA failed to adequately consider the factors listed in the definition’s
parenthetical, perhaps for some of the reasons we discuss in Part III, infra.
55
See generally NSPS, supra note 25.
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plants, and then it attempted to support the standard by referencing technologies and operational
changes that could be used to achieve those standards.56 The first building block of the CPP is a
variant of this type of traditional standard—it requires coal-fired EGUs to improve their
efficiency to achieve fewer emissions. But the much larger second and third blocks of the CPP
go “beyond the fence-line” of a single plant and therefore arguably are not “standards” within the
meaning of the CAA. In other words, petitioners will argue that EPA lacks the statutory
authority to use building blocks 2 and 3 as BSER.
B.

Judicial Review of EPA’s Jurisdictional Interpretations

When courts review agencies’ interpretations of statutes they administer, the typical
analytical framework is that set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.57 Chevron, of course, traditionally involves a two-step analysis that asks first
whether Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to
an agency’s permissible interpretation.58 Notably, Chevron extends to an agency’s interpretation
of the scope of its own jurisdiction; it is not limited to smaller interpretive questions involving
how the agency applies its authority.59 Under the holding of Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, if a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation determines
that the statute has a clear meaning, the agency is not free on remand to depart from that
determination.60 But if a court determines that the statute is ambiguous, the agency is free to

56

57

We do not here elaborate our concerns that the NSPS are arbitrary and capricious.

467 U.S. 837 (1984). The two-step framework provides that courts must ask first whether
Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to an
agency’s permissible interpretation.
58
Id. at 842-43.
59
60

City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869-71 (2013).
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
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later adopt a different interpretation provided that interpretation is permissible.61 Moreover,
there is no heightened standard of review when an agency makes such a change.62

In explaining its rationale for how it reconciled the competing versions of section 111(d),
EPA did not explicitly walk through a Chevron analysis,63 relying instead on traditional means of
statutory interpretation such as considering the language of the provisions, the legislative history,
the purpose of the statute, and the like.64 EPA’s discussion of BSER similarly does not explicitly
reference Chevron, but it follows Chevron’s logic. For example, it notes that BSER is undefined,
“broad and capacious,” and it emphasizes that Congress gave EPA interpretive authority to
determine BSER65—considerations familiar to Chevron step one. The Agency next argues the
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purpose and legislative history of the CAA as
well as with the “structure and economics of the utility power sector.”66
Notwithstanding the Chevron paradigm that features so strongly in this and other
administrative law discussions, we highlight here what neither side has explicitly engaged, but
what we expect is a driving concern: the bigger-picture issue of regulatory stability lurking
behind Chevron. To demonstrate, we will briefly sketch how Chevron might apply to each issue
and what the long-term ramifications might be.

61

Id. at

62

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009).

63

It cited the doctrine in a footnote. CPP, supra note 1, at 64,719 n.301.
Some courts include these considerations in step one, others in step two. See Emily Hammond et al., Judicial
Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES 65-100 (collecting examples). We think the best characterization of EPA’s approach is to place
its analysis in step two.
65
E.g., CPP, supra note 1, at 64,761.
66
Id.
64
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Turning first to the section 112 exclusion issue, it seems unlikely that EPA would
succeed at step one by arguing that the statute is clear, given its prior opposite interpretation of
the exclusion.67 Given the inconsistency of the two versions of section112 and EPA’s
inconsistent interpretations of that section, it would be hard for a court to support a conclusion
that Congress “directly spoke to the issue.” Thus, if a court applies Chevron, it should hold that
Congress did not resolve the issue and, hence, it must uphold the EPA interpretation if it is
reasonable.68
Second, whether Congress directly spoke to the beyond-the-fence-line issue, is a question
that could be answered intellectually honestly in support of either clear language or ambiguity.
That outcome likely depends on a reviewing court’s choice of the many approaches to step one,
the variety and merits of which we do not endeavor to survey here.69 But by way of example,
dictionary definitions have figured prominently in judicial analyses at step one,70 and definitions
here point in opposing directions. One definition of “standard,” for example, supports a plain
meaning akin to what EPA has done in the past: “a level of quality achievement, etc. that is
considered acceptable or desirable,” e.g., “something set up and established by authority as a rule
for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality.”71 These concepts do not seem to
fit with massive fuel switching, and EPA has never before understood its statutory mandate in

67

This likely explains EPA’s avoidance of the step one issue in the relevant portion of the CPP.
As this analysis and that regarding the beyond-the-fence-line issue demonstrate, we do not attempt an exhaustive
briefing of Chevron as applied to the CPP.
69
We have done so elsewhere. Cf. PIERCE, supra note [40], §§ 3.5-.6; Hammond, supra note ___ , at 77-93
(documenting and discussing the many approaches to step one).
70
Id. at 82-83 (collecting sources).
71
Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/standard (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
Note that EPA avoided an analogous issue with respect to CO2 emission standards for new motor vehicles,
following Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 597 (2007), by conducting a joint rulemaking with the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration, which has clear authority to require reductions in fossil fuel use. See LightDuty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Final Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (2010) (explaining that rule is joint rulemaking).
68

13

Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission

that way.72 On the other hand, “system” might permit the fuel-switching approach. “System”
means “a group of related parts that move or work together,” e.g., “a regularly interacting or
interdependent group of items forming a unified system.”73 EPA reasons that “system” works
well for the U.S. electricity grid, which it accurately describes as an interdependent and
interconnected group of EGUs that must function as a whole.74 EPA also argues persuasively
that it must rely primarily on mandatory fuel-switching by the interdependent group of EGUs
that comprise the grid to achieve significant emissions reductions because CO2 is unique as a
pollutant; it cannot be reduced significantly with traditional pollution-control devices.75 Thus, if
EPA cannot require fuel-switching it has no means of mitigating climate change caused by
EGUs—notwithstanding its prior determination that GHG emissions endanger public health.76
These latter arguments help demonstrate that EPA’s interpretation of BSER is permissible and
not foreclosed by the clear language of the statute.77
But for either of these statutory issues—whether the section 112 exemption or the
beyond-the-fence-line argument—a court’s reaching step two would create a strange situation.
A new EPA Administrator appointed by a President who does not share President Obama’s
enthusiasm for the CPP’s approach could adopt the opposite interpretations, and a reviewing
court would be required to uphold those interpretations as long as they are permissible under the
reasoning adopted in Brand X.78 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that an agency can
adopt an interpretation of a statute it implements that is inconsistent with its prior interpretation
72

Other portions of the statute support the concept of discrete standards applied on a smokestack- or plant-widebasis. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(B) (“in applying a standard of performance to any particular source, . . .”
73
Merriam Webster, supra note 71.
74
CPP, supra note 1, at 64,677–78.
75
Id. at 64,690.
76
See Coal. for Responsible Reg. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, 134 S. Ct.
2427 (2014) (upholding endangerment finding)
77
Once again, this brief discussion provides only a small summary of the analysis supporting a determination that
EPA’s interpretation is permissible. Cf. CPP, supra note 2, at Pt. V.A.1, p. 64,718 (presenting EPA’s full analysis).
78
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
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without providing any heightened explanation that the new interpretation is better than the old
interpretation.79 An agency needs only to establish that the new interpretation is permissible.80
In other words, the ordinary step two analysis applies—and we would expect agencies’ win rates
at step two to be quite high.81
Yet it does not seem sensible to have a legal regime in which EPA’s view of its
jurisdictional authority (the section 112 exemption issue) and the fundamental predicate of the
CPP (the beyond-the-fence-line issue) can change dramatically every four to eight years.
Implementing the CPP requires owners of EGUs to make massive investments in long-lived
assets, the value of which will depend critically on the legal regime in which they operate for
decades. It would be difficult to persuade investors to put billions of dollars at risk by making
those investments knowing that the legal regime could easily change in ways that would reduce
significantly the value of those investments. At a minimum, that legal uncertainty would
increase significantly the cost of implementing the CPP by increasing the cost of the capital
required to implement the CPP.
This is a way in which the CPP strains administrative law. The Brand X decision has
been criticized primarily on separation-of-powers grounds; Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion,
for example, states: “Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or

79

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009).
Id. at 515.
81
Studies of affirmance rates under the Chevron doctrine show agency win rates ranging from about 64 to about
81%. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 77, 84
(2011) (collecting studies and noting slight decrease in win rates over time); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1129 (2008) (finding Chevron win rate at over 76%, but win rate regardless of
deference regime at about 68%). These studies do not necessarily disaggregate steps one and two. Note that earlier
studies suggest EPA has a lower than average win rate. See Jonathan H. Adler, No Intelligible Principles: The
EPA’s Record in Federal Court, RPPI POL’Y STUDY NO. 269, at 10 (reporting 41% Chevron win rate for EPA in
D.C. Circuit between 1993 and 2000); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and
EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371, 10,374 (2001) (reporting 53% Chevron
win rate for EPA between 1991 and 1999).
80
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ignored by executive officers.”82 But the CPP shows its impact pragmatically: the reliance
interests of the regulated industry as well as the public are staggering. Indeed, the Justices have
become uncomfortable with this particular effect of the many deference doctrines.83 Those
doctrines often create a situation in which the law has dramatically different meanings and
effects depending on the political philosophy of the incumbent President. Thus, for instance, the
meaning of many statutes that apply to labor relations varies from pro-union in a Democratic
administration to pro-management in a Republican administration.84 Recent experience with
EPA’s regulatory approach to interstate air pollution has illustrated this flip-flopping, as has the
Agency’s approach to regulating air toxics and GHGs from EGUs under the CAA.85 This is a
disquieting effect of the deference doctrines in every context,86 but it has the potential to create
severe problems if it is applied in circumstances like these, where the authority of the agency to
act at all is under question.87

82

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, -- GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. – (forthcoming) (criticizing
Brand X for creating regulatory uncertainty).
84
E.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1205 (2015).
85
See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (upholding Obama-era Cross State
Air Pollution Rule); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (invalidating Bush-era Clean Air
Interstate Rule); see also Emily Hammond, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1722 (2011) (collecting other examples of agencies’ changed policies over courses of repeated judicial review). On
the air toxics issue, some of the history is recounted in White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222,
1229-33 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
86
The presidential control model of administrative law presumably would view executive direction as a legitimizing
force to counteract our arguments here. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2
(2009). Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J.
1763, 1807 (2012) (criticizing presidential control in favor of statutory primacy).
87
Where to draw the line between types of interpretive issues is a challenging question. We ourselves have
somewhat differing views. Compare Pierce, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (arguing against Brand X
generally); with Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Generality Principles, 83 FORD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2014) (arguing
there is “nothing inherently illegitimate in an agency’s revising its interpretation”). Merely describing some issues
as jurisdictional and others as interstitial is unsatisfying because, as Justice Scalia explained in City of Arlington,
ultimately any interpretive question relates to the agency’s statutory authority. See 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (“No matter
how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it
administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”).
83
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For the CPP, therefore, a reviewing court might take a cue from the Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in King v. Burwell.88 The Court had to decide whether a critical provision of the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) had a meaning that was consistent with the purposes of the ACA
or had a meaning that would make it virtually impossible to continue to implement the ACA.89
The provision was so poorly crafted that it is easy to understand why the three dissenting Justices
concluded that it clearly required a course of action that would erode political support for the
ACA by depriving the citizens of thirty-one states from access to one of the most valuable
benefits provided by the Act.90
A six-Justice majority believed that the provision at issue was ambiguous.91 Yet—after
acknowledging that normally such a situation would point to Chevron deference to the IRS’s
interpretation—the majority declined to apply that approach.92 Why? The Court explained that
Chevron is premised on an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the relevant agency,
but “[i]n extraordinary cases, . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.”93 The Court reasoned that the “deep economic and
political significance” of the issue was so important that it was not willing to attribute to
Congress an intent to allow the Agency to adopt its own interpretation of the provision.94 This
was particularly true because the IRS did not have expertise in health care policy.95

88

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
See id. at 2492-93 (describing interpretations).
90
See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 2492 (majority op’n). Among other things, it considered other provisions of the ACA that were obviously
inconsistent with the language of the provision at issue and evidence of congressional purpose in reaching this
determination. Id. at 2489-92.
92
Id. at 2488-89.
93
Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
94
Id. at 2489 (citing Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). The majority then relied primarily
on the policies underlying the ACA to support its own interpretation of the provision, which fit well with the
purpose of the statute. Id. at 2491-98.
95
Id. at 2489.
89
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King was an excellent candidate for the Court’s refusal to accord deference to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term. The ACA is controversial and has been
the subject of partisan acrimony. Whether you like or dislike the ACA, it is hard to believe
anyone would favor the chaotic situation that would exist if one of the core provisions of the
ACA was effective only half of the time, depending on the results of each presidential election.
And for those ascribing to the implicit delegation rationale of Chevron,96 the IRS’s interpretive
role seems far removed from typical Chevron cases in which there is no doubt about the
interpreting agency’s expertise.97
The pending litigation to review the legality of the CPP is at least as strong a candidate
for that treatment. To see why, it is important to note that the Courts has identified several types
of cases in which Chevron will not apply. King illustrated two: both the significance of the
ACA98 and the IRS’s lack of expertise99 supported the Court’s approach. Other examples
include situations where more than one agency administers the statute in question,100 and where
the agency used procedures that were less democratic than those in notice-and-comment
rulemaking or the APA’s formal methods.101 Ultimately, these categories are born of analyses
that ask whether Congress intended to delegate the interpretive authority to the agency.102 With

96

The Court itself frequently uses such language, e.g., id. at 2488 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). A variety of scholars
also espouse this view. E.g. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7, 35 (2015) (arguing in
support of delegation theory). The numerous potential rationales for Chevron are collected in numerous places; at
least one of us does not necessarily think the delegation rationale is particularly compelling. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld,
Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 277-88 (2011) (criticizing intent-based rationales).
97
See Hammond, supra note [86 (Duke piece)], at 1771-74, 1803-04 (describing relevance of expertise in
determining whether deference is appropriate).
98
See also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“we must be guided to a degree
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and
political magnitude to an administrative agency”).
99
See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) (noting congressional “unwillingness to cede medical
judgments to an executive official [U.S. Attorney General] who lacks medical expertise”).
100
E.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (APA).
101
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230 (2001).
102
E.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015).
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respect to the section 112 exemption issue, it seems very difficult to attribute an intent to
delegate by a Congress that did not reach agreement on the language it passed. Because of this
unique set of facts, moreover, it is not a material point of distinction that EPA here has expertise
with respect to the CAA (unlike the IRS in King). Furthermore, the significance of the the CPP
is enormous, both politically and economically.103 No one would gain from a situation in which
firms are strongly encouraged to make investments in long-lived assets and then see the value of
those investments dissipate dramatically a few years later due to political flip-flopping.
A difficulty with this approach is its indeterminacy: how ought a court decide whether an
interpretive issue is sufficiently “important” to take it out of the Chevron framework? Granting
the problematic nature of such an inquiry, we think that the scope of the CPP is such that it is not
a case on the margins. Perhaps because of such indeterminacy difficulties, we also note that the
Court frequently ducks the Chevron issue altogether, applying its own statutory interpretation
rather than Chevron even when an issue fits the Chevron prerequisites.104 We think the better
approach is the direct one: the Court should explain why Chevron is not applicable and use
EPA’s well-reasoned analysis to reach a favorable jurisdictional decision that cannot be
disturbed by shifting political whims.105
This discussion raises the question whether a King approach should be used for both the
section 112 exemption and the beyond-the-fence-line issues. On one hand, the former issue is a
103

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-528 (2007) (citing Chevron for generalized agency discretion but
failing to apply that framework and concluding that statutory text forecloses agency’s interpretation); id. at 553
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The court nowhere explains why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone why it is not
entitled to deference under Chevron . . . .”); see also Eskirdge & Baer, supra note [81], at 1117-18 (describing large
number of cases in which Court applied no deference regime at all)..
105
That is, section 111(d) is meant to ensure there are no regulatory gaps for particular pollutants; while BSER, as
interpreted by EPA, is perhaps the only way to address GHG emissions from EGUs, making it the best interpretation
consistent with the CAA’s mandate to regulate pollutants found to endanger the public health and welfare. GHGs,
of course, already fit the endangerment criterion. Admittedly, it is plausible that a court might adopt either of the
competing interpretations for each issue discussed above. Leaving our own views aside, it must be emphasized that
this approach would at least promote regulatory certainty.
104
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better candidate for King treatment from a delegation perspective because of the perplexing
matter of two different statutory amendments in addition to its importance politically and
economically. Moreover, it is aimed at EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from existing EGU’s
at all, such that shifting interpretations over time would most disturb regulatory stability. The
latter issue might not be so compelling because it does not share the unusual statutory
background and is of second-order jurisdictional importance. On the other hand, the latter issue
is certainly jurisdictional—it provides the predicate to EPA’s approach to the CPP—and the
Supreme Court has instructed that it does not matter for deference regimes what type of
jurisdictional question is at issue.106 Furthermore, EPA’s interpretation of BSER here provides
the entire foundation of the CPP (thus carrying the same political and economic significance); a
new interpretation in 2017 would certainly disturb regulatory stability.107
But even if King were not applied to the fence-line issue, we argue that two other recent
decisions—both involving EPA—point to what might be called “Brand X avoidance” and may
have particular applicability. As noted above, Justice Scalia has been a strong critic of Brand X,
and his approach to Chevron has set clear boundaries on Brand X’s applicability. In the face of
ambiguous statutory terms, he has sometimes concluded that EPA’s interpretation is clearly
foreclosed. The impact of that approach is best illustrated by two cases. First, in Michigan v.
EPA,108 Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of another
provision of the CAA to preclude cost considerations was clearly beyond the bounds of the
statute.109 This unusually strong version of step two makes it a practical impossibility for EPA
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City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
One of us would be reluctant to extend this rationale even further to other non-predicate interpretations within the
CPP; the other more willing. See Pierce, supra note 83.
108
135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
109
Id. at 2707. In fact, all nine Justices appear to agree on this point. See id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
107
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ever to adopt an interpretation that does not consider cost—notwithstanding the usual Brand X
norm that would permit flexibility in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms.
Second, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,110 Justice Scalia (again writing for the
majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of yet another provision of the CAA was foreclosed
by the statute. There, EPA interpreted the provision “any air pollutant” to include GHG
emissions for purposes of the prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) program.111 The
Court reasoned that this language was not unambiguous, but rather context-specific;112 and in
this particular context EPA’s interpretation was foreclosed because it would “overthrow” the
statutory design.113 Because GHGs are emitted at levels far greater than traditional pollutants,
PSD regulation would swamp EPA, overwhelm state regulators, and impose billions of dollars in
costs on both regulated sources and agencies.114 This result would be contrary to the statutory
design, because Congress clearly intended the PSD provisions to apply only to “major”
sources.115 Perhaps even more salient to the CPP, the Court emphasized that EPA’s
interpretation was unreasonable because the Agency was “laying claim to extravagant statutory
power over the national economy” without clear congressional authorization.116
It is easy to imagine Justice Scalia writing a similar opinion in reviewing the CPP that
uses a similar approach to support a holding that no interpretation of section111(d) that

110

134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
Id. at 2439. The following analysis relates to the Court’s consideration of sources that are not otherwise
regulated under the PSD program. See id. at 2447 (describing distinction from “anyway” sources).
112
Id. at 2442.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2442-43.
115
Id. at 2443.
116
Id. at 2444. Nor did EPA’s Tailoring rule save its construction, because that rule departed from the clear
statutory text. Id. at 2445. The nondelegation overtones are not lost on us. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (noting Congress “must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect
the entire national economy”).
111
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authorizes EPA to regulate “beyond the fence line” can be reasonable.117 However, it would be
difficult for a court to resolve the interpretative issues raised by the section 112 exclusion
through use of that method. The court would have to conclude either that no interpretation of
any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably allow EPA to regulate GHG emissions from
EGUs or that no interpretation of any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably prohibit
EPA from regulating GHG emissions from EGUs. Any opinion that attempted to support either
of those extreme propositions would seem disingenuous and, thus, probably motivated by the
personal beliefs of the judges or Justices.
C.

Remedies

Any challenge to the CPP will include a request to stay the rule pending the outcome of
litigation. If a court ultimately decides the rule is flawed in some way, it will also need to
determine the best remedial option—a remand either with or without vacatur. Two different
standards are therefore at play, those for: (1) granting a stay; and (2) determining whether to
remand with vacatur. We show how these issues have already been framed before considering
their relevance to the remedial options and accompanying standards.
1.

Early Issue Development

EPA, would-be-petitioners, and (in part) the D.C. Circuit itself have already put forth
their positions regarding the interests at stake. After EPA announced the proposed rule in 2014,
a coal company and various other parties benefited by coal mining or use, sought an
extraordinary writ enjoining the CPP, arguing that the need to take substantial and costly steps
toward compliance were already creating significant hardship.118 Acknowledging that “prudent
organizations and individuals may alter their behavior (and thereby incur costs) based on what

117
118

Here is where we hesitate, because as a policy matter, we favor efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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they think is likely to come,” the court rejected an invitation to become involved prior to the
rule’s finalization.119 This outcome is typical. Extraordinary writs, which are to be issued
sparingly,120 require: (1) no other adequate means of relief; (2) a clear and indisputable
entitlement to relief; and (3) the court’s satisfaction that the writ is appropriate.121 Even though
the final condition enables consideration of equitable factors, courts have resisted requests to
issue writs founded on hardship in complying with the law.122
Similarly, shortly after the final rule’s announcement—but before its publication—
another coalition of states sought another extraordinary writ, seeking a stay of the rule’s
deadlines until litigation is complete.123 The CAA, however, specifies that petitions must be
filed within sixty days of publication in the Federal Register.124 And in a terse two-paragraph
order, the D.C. Circuit rejected the petition.125 Once again, when a regular appeals process is
available, a court’s interest in proceeding according to the statutory scheme rather than granting
an extraordinary writ will trump a petitioner’s cry of hardship.126
Though premature, this early activity provides a preview of some of the fairness and
reliance issues that will take center stage in the next challenge. The state petitioners contended
that relief was justified because the CPP gives states thirteen months from its announcement to
submit their initial plans, rather than keying the deadline to the date of publication in the Federal

119

Id.
In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 339 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., diss.).
121
In re Kellogg Brown & Roots, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
122
Murray Energy, 788 F.3d at 335.
123
In re W.Va., No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter “Emer. Pet’n”]. On August 5, 2015, several
states also filed an application with EPA, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705, requesting the agency itself to stay the rule’s
effective date of action. Id. at 4 n.2. EPA denied the request. Id.
124
5 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
125
Order, No. 15-1284, Doc. No. 1572185 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2015).
126
See U.S. ex rel. Denholm & McKary Co. v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 125 F.2d 557, 558 (D.C. Cir 1942) (“the
use of special writs to review . . . the action of . . . administrative bodies had its origins in the days of the stone age
of administrative law” when regularized forms of appeal were lacking).
120

23

Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission

Register.127 If petitioners were required to wait until the rules’ publication in the “normal course,”
they were likely correct that any relief may not come until halfway through the states’
preparation time.128 The coal company petitioner put its irreparable injury argument simply:
“The Final Rule is aimed squarely at coal.”129 After all, the petitioner argued, EPA’s own
modeling suggests significant plant retirements in 2016.130 Because electricity companies must
plan several years in advance, the petitioner argued that irrevocable closure decisions would be
made years before litigation is complete.131
In response, EPA emphasized that the rule’s actual deadlines are 2018 and beyond; the
initial state submittal in September 2016 is only a general statement of approaches under
consideration, progress to date, and a description of opportunities for public input.132 Further, as
described above, a state can even forgo developing a plan altogether.133 To the coal company’s
argument of irreparable harm, EPA responded that—with emissions reductions not even slated to
become effective until 2022—litigation would be complete well before that deadline.134 And
EPA also underplayed its modeling, noting that while its final rule showed eleven gigawatts of
coal-fired power ceasing by 2016, the model was meant to be illustrative rather than
predictive.135
That last point underscores what is different about the CPP: both the type and degree of
regulatory uncertainty during the litigation period are unprecedented. Regarding type, consider
the discussion above, which emphasized that typical CAA regulations involve technology
127

Emer. Pet’n at 1-2.
See Emer. Pet’n at 3.
129
Emer. Renewed Pet’n for Extraordinary Writ by Intervenor Peabody Energy Corp., No. 15-1277, Doc. No.
1567796, at 23 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015).
130
Id. at 24.
131
Id.
132
EPA Resp. in Opp’n, No. 15-1277, Doc. No. 1570665, at 25-26 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 31, 2015).
133
Id. at 26.
134
Id. at 28-29.
135
Id. at 29.
128
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mandates.136 A regulated entity is likely to know years before such a mandate is finalized that it
is under consideration; after all, many of the technology-based standards require some basis in
existing technology.137 Prudent investors—who likely had a hand in developing the applicable
standards—are likely to begin complying even during the pendency of litigation
(notwithstanding their predictable cost-based resistance in the courts).138 Here, however, the
building blocks and flexibility of the CPP do not mandate any particular technology.139 The
scope of possibilities is so broad as to be overwhelming, and the only message of certainty is that
EPA has taken aim at coal. It is perfectly logical, then, that new coal plants are unlikely to be
built.140 And if—as building block 1 suggests—coal-fired generation is to be replaced with
natural gas, at least some plant closures appear unavoidable.141 This observation points to the
difference in degree of the CPP’s impact. Although typical environmental controls have indirect

136

We are focused here on compliance standards, rather than, for example, listing criteria or national air quality
standards. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-35 (2006) (describing need to consider whether to make
endangerment finding; Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 464-471 (2001) (holding CAA forbids EPA
from considering cost in setting national ambient air quality standards)..
137
E.g., best achievable etc. see also Wendy E. Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 111 (2011) (“Industry enjoys a particularly privileged
position in the development of rules like the air toxic emission standards because industry possesses a great deal of
in-house information on industrial processes that EPA needs to write the rules.”).
138
This is what happened in the example of the MATS standards for coal-fired EGUs. See White Stallion Energy
Ctr. v. EPA, No. 12-1100 (Oral Arg. Recording at 36:12 – 36:58) (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2015) (counsel for coal-fired
EGUs arguing D.C. Circuit should not vacate MATS rule on remand, in part because industry has already complied
and would face stranded costs if there were a vacatur).
139
This line of reasoning links closely to the “beyond-the-fence line” issue described supra Part II.A.
140
Perhaps illustrating the broader point about industry responding to the regulatory climate, note that new coal
plants have not been built for several years. See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, Electricity Generation, Fig.
35 (2015) (“As a result of the uncertainty surrounding future greenhouse gas legislation and regulations and given its
high capital costs, very little unplanned coal-fired capacity is added across all the AEO2015 cases.”) [hereinafter
AEO2015].
141
Of course, industry may be overstating the point. The Energy Information Administration, for example, has
noted that reduced use of coal is strongly related to low natural gas prices. Id. at Fig. 35 (showing mix of capacity
varies primarily according to natural gas prices); cf. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED
STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 87-91 (2015) (describing periods of
inverse relationship between natural gas prices and coal-fired capacity, aided by technological advances in gas-fired
generation).
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impacts on the electrical fuel mix by influencing the relative market price of power,142 the scope
of the CPP is such that it will alter the design of the markets themselves.143
2.

Preliminary Injunctive Relief

The standard on a motion for preliminary injunction is equitable and requires a court to
consider: (1) the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparably
injury absent the injunction; (3) the possibility of harm to others if the injunction is issued; and
(4) the public interest.144 The discussion above anticipates the parties’ arguments: the
petitioners will contend that EPA lacks authority to issue the CPP (and to do so in the way it has),
meaning there is a likelihood of success on the merits; the petitioners will also focus on the
burden of complying with a rule of unprecedented scope; EPA will emphasize the sheer
magnitude of the climate change problem and the role of the rule in furthering the public interest
as embodied in the CAA.
Short of a quick ruling that the petitioners will likely succeed on the merits—which
would all but end the litigation145—the real stake at this procedural stage is the rule’s momentum
at the end of a presidential term. No doubt EPA would prefer to keep the rule in force so that
compliance may begin while President Obama is in office. Even an injunction for a year forces

142

See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, --VAND. L. REV. –
(forthcoming 2016).
143
For example, a compliance approach might involve altering least-cost dispatch to account for electricity fuel
preferences. This would require a number of steps, including for example approval of new market tariffs by FERC.
144
Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1987). EPA could have stayed the rule’s effect on
its own, 5 U.S.C. § 705, but it did not do so. Note that administrative law doctrine accounts for these interests in
additional ways. For example, the availability of pre-enforcement review is predicated on a concern for hardship to
the regulated industry; the CAA permits even more lenient standards for such review. See Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 479–80 (2000).
145
Cases usually settle at this point. There is another important context in which the decision to issue a preliminary
injunction has devastating effects. The Federal Trade Commission can obtain a preliminary injunction to stop a
merger through use of a standard that is easier to meet than the standard applicable to the actions of other agencies.
The issuance of the preliminary injunction is outcome-determinative because the proceeding to resolve the case on
the merits take so long that the parties to the merger have no choice but to capitulate. See Richard Pierce, The Rocky
Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, -----GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. -----(forthcoming 2016).
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the burden of inertia back to the status quo and buys time for the next administration to change
its approach.146 This, of course, is the very risk with which we are concerned in the preceding
section; administrative law doctrine contemplates that agencies will change their approaches.
When so much is at stake, that aspect of administrative law seems normatively flawed.
3.

Remanding With or Without Vacatur

As we have noted, the variety of ways in which a court might find flaws in the CPP is
staggering. For any of these defects, the APA provides that the reviewing court “shall” “set
aside” the defective “agency action, findings, and conclusions.”147 Despite the mandatory
wording, courts have never followed this language strictly; sometimes they vacate an agency’s
decision,148 while other times they simply remand.149 Further, courts have applied both
approaches to remedy the various types of defects we have identified.150 Doctrinal guidance on
selecting the approach is sparse,151 but the D.C. Circuit has articulated a balancing test that
favors remands without vacatur by considering the “seriousness of the . . . deficiencies (and thus
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See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Bloodsport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61
DUKE L.J. 1671, 1677-78 (2012) (describing fierce political climate and pressure of constant opposition from
regulated entities that promote statutory goals to erode over time).
147
5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (“the court may reverse”).
148
See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)
(concluding agency failed to supply reasoned analysis and vacating and remanding); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
143 (1973) (vacating and remanding Comptroller of Currency’s denial of bank charter for failure to explain basis of
denial).
149
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 191 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding worker
safety standard but declining to vacate where “the only identified defect in a standard is the lack of an adequate
statement of reasons”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding without
vacating technical amendments to NOx SIP Call; defect involved adopting new definition of electricity generating
unit without providing notice and opportunity for comment). For a discussion of how the remedy interacts with
multiple remands of the same agency action, see generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011).
150
To be sure, the appropriateness of vacating or not depends on the grounds for a court’s holding that the agency
acted unlawfully. If the court holds EPA lacks jurisdiction under § 111(d) to regulate GHGs at all, for example, the
rule would be ultra vires and the vacation issue moot. E.g., Coal. for Responsible Reg. v. EPA, 606 Fed. Appx. 6, 7
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating GHG rules for major stationary sources not already subject to PSD requirements in
accordance with holding in Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which held that EPA lacked
authority to regulate such sources).
151
It is also inconsistently applied. Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial
Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemaking, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 293-94 (2005).
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the extent of doubt whether the [A]gency chose correctly), the likelihood that the [A]gency will
be able to correct the deficiencies on remand and the disruptive consequences of an interim
change that may itself be changed.”152
This standard reflects the reality that the practical import of the choice matters deeply: if
the CPP is vacated, it is extinguished—as if the rule had never been promulgated.153 Not only
does this result forestall the massive changes that might be embodied in state implementation
plans, but it could eliminate that possibility altogether if the next administration chooses not to
pursue a revision.154 If the CPP is remanded without vacatur, the rule remains in force—
meaning regulated parties must comply.155 Of course, as discussed above, a new administration
might direct EPA to change its policy under this scenario as well.156 But the inertia of
compliance could be difficult to undo—particularly if the CPP was not stayed pending litigation.
Part of the lesson here is that the battles of the CPP—its statutory legitimacy and
reasonableness in particular—will be won or lost not so much on the substance but on the
remedial choices during and following litigation. We have described the balancing of interests
relevant to whether a stay pending litigation should be granted,157 but it is critical to see that the
impacts of that decision stand to be amplified in a court’s ultimate choice of remedy. Consider
these scenarios, all of which would entail a flaw in reasoned decisionmaking (rather than a
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Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75-76 (1995) (noting test favors remand without vacatur for reasoned
decisionmaking flaws because of likelihood that agencies can substantiate their decisions on remand).
153
Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (separate op’n of Silberman, J.) (agency must “initiate
another rulemaking proceeding as if it would seek to confront the problem anew”).
154
Major rules promulgated under the CAA are notorious for EPA flip-flopping according to presidential policy.
E.g., Chevron; NOx SIP Call, Homer City (cross-state), MACTs.
155
Id. Moreover, subsequent judicial review will be confined to the matters addressed on remand. See generally
Hammond, supra note 1495, at 1738 (discussing these distinctions).
156
See supra text accompanying notes___.
157
See supra text accompanying notes ___.
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holding that EPA acted ultra vires).158 First, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, and
remand with vacatur. This combination effectively kills compliance and returns the parties to the
pre-CPP status quo. Second, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, but remand without
vacatur. This combination provides a minor setback in compliance, but permits substantial steps
toward compliance thereafter (at the risk of a change in administration). Third, a court might
decline to grant a stay pending litigation, but remand with vacatur. This approach would be
wasteful in hindsight because states will have begun developing their compliance plans during
the pendency of litigation, only to be relieved of the obligation to comply on remand.159 If the
coal companies and coal-fired utilities are right about investors’ decisions, moreover, some of
the coal fleet may be lost during this time. Finally, a court might decline to grant a stay pending
litigation and remand without vacatur. This approach most fully moves compliance forward—
which may result in changes that are irreversible as a practical matter, notwithstanding a change
in administration.
Thus, the normative aspects of the ultimate choice of remedy bear consideration. The
practice of remanding without vacatur has been criticized on statutory interpretation grounds;160
others have raised the normative concern that remands without vacatur are used inappropriately
to soften the impact of hard-look review.161 Other possible objections are that remanding
without vacatur can undermine the constitutional underpinnings of the Chenery doctrine by
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For purposes of this discussion, we adopt the premise that some aspect of the CPP will fail the reasoned decision
making test. See Pierce, supra note [7 Ways], at 69 (with respect to searches for flaws in agency’s reasoned
decisionmaking, “[t]hat search will always bear fruit.”). Of course, if a court holds EPA lacks statutory authority
under the § 112 exemption or beyond-the-fence-line reasoning we have set forth supra Part II.C, the discussion here
is moot.
159
Of course, this is the crux of the hardship prong of the preliminary injunction standard.
160
E.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (“Setting aside means
vacating; no other meaning is apparent.”).
161
The premise here is that searching scrutiny is harmful. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great
Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004).
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leaving in place a rule that cannot stand on an agency’s original reasoning.162 Still, many see the
flexibility in determining a remedy as solidly grounded in Article III,163 pragmatic in promoting
court-agency dialogue,164 and useful as a guard against ossification.165
How does the CPP itself interact with these considerations? First, we expect judicial
review in this case to fall on the rigorous end of the spectrum.166 Provided the flaws a court finds
are remediable, remand without vacatur offers a counter-balance to searching review, albeit
imperfectly. Further, the separation-of-powers concerns raised by both the CPP itself and
judicial review of the Plan are heightened. As many have recognized, the CPP is a significant
example of agency activity filling the vacuum left by a gridlocked Congress.167 This fact helps
justify the extensive need for reason-giving that is embodied in the CAA as well as
administrative law doctrine, and perhaps offers a reason to weigh our ossification concerns less
heavily for this particular analysis. On the other hand, if the need for statutory and democratic
legitimacy is at its highest when an agency’s action has such sweeping ramifications,168 then a
flaw in reason-giving admittedly may justify vacatur as a check on agency behavior. Overall, we
take a pragmatic view: vacating a remediable rule only reinforces instability and exacerbates the
problems already noted with a Chevron approach to the interpretive issues. The reliability of our
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Hammond, supra note 126, at 1784.
Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53
DUKE L.J. 291, 361 (referencing “judicial humility”).
164
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1998).
165
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 77-78 (1995); see also
William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 414 (2000).
166
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411 (noting vacillation between
levels of scrutiny). The D.C. Circuit has ratcheted up its hard-look review in recent years, though the exact
approach seems highly dependent on which panel the litigants get. Compare, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, with
EME Homer Generation, rev’d, Michigan v. EPA (upholding EPA’s determination that it did not need to consider
costs in determining whether to regulate air toxics from EGUs).
167
E.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-42 (2014).
168
Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (invoking constitutional concerns when
agency would regulate enormous scope of activity).
163
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electricity system, and the impacts of climate change, are issues too serious to bear an on-again,
off-again approach.
III.

Implementation Issues
Putting aside for now the doctrinal challenges for the CPP, we turn to two major

implementation issues: (a) the challenges created by fuel-switching to intermittent sources; and
(b) the limitations states may encounter as a result of retail or wholesale restructuring status. It
seems possible that opponents of the CPP might argue that these issues render the CPP arbitrary
and capricious, but our purpose is not to make those arguments. Rather, we raise our concerns as
they relate to our views of energy policy and law more generally.
A.

Challenges Created by Intermittent Sources

The largest reductions in GHG emissions expected as a result of implementation of the
CPP are in building blocks 2 and 3. As described in Part I above, block 2 contemplates EGUs
will switch first from coal to natural gas, which would achieve at least some reduction in GHG
emissions. To achieve even further reductions, block 3 contemplates that EGUs will switch from
fossil fuels to wind and solar.169 The good news is that the unit cost of producing electricity
through use of some forms of wind and solar in some locations has declined significantly in
recent years.170 The bad news is that both wind and solar are intermittent sources of electricity.
As Paul Joskow has explained in detail, intermittent sources of electricity are much less
valuable than dispatchable sources—those that can be called upon to generate electricity at any
time.171 Almost all EGUs that use fossil fuels are dispatchable, while no EGU that uses wind or
169

This is the expectation for the CPP’s compliance period. As the CPP discusses, other low-carbon sources such as
nuclear count toward compliance, but were not included in block 3 because of their longer construction times. CPP
supra note 1, at 64,803.
170
INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION COSTS IN 2014 12 – 13 (2015); Tara Patel,
Bloomberg Business, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage Over Solar, Wind, IEA Says, Aug. 31, 2015.
171
Paul Joskow, Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable Generating Technologies, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 238 (2012).
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solar is dispatchable. That distinction is important because of two basic characteristics of the
electricity market. First, demand for electricity varies greatly every minute. Second, because
electricity cannot be stored economically, it must be consumed at exactly the same time that it is
generated.172 Those two characteristics underlie a market in which there must always be enough
supply to meet current demand and in which electricity is much more valuable at times of peak
demand than at times of low demand.173 By definition, dispatchable sources, including most
EGUs that use fossil fuels, are available at times of peak demand. By contrast, the availability of
electricity from the sun depends on whether the sun is shining and the availability of electricity
from wind depends on whether the wind is blowing at a velocity that allows a particular wind
turbine to turn at a particular speed.174
The usefulness of an intermittent source depends on several variables. First, the
availability factor of the source is important. “Availability factor” refers to the amount of time a
source is able to produce electricity, divided by the amount of time in a given period.175 Fossilfueled EGUs typically have much higher availability factors than wind and solar, due again to
intermittency. Because intermittent sources may not be available when they are needed, their
“load-serving capacity” is lower than that of fossil-fueled sources; that is, their nameplate
capacities are derated to account for unavailability.176 Under this metric, wind’s load-serving
capacity may be as low as ten percent of its nameplate capacity.177 Second, the correlation
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For an overview, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 110.
Paul Joskow & Catherine Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 381 (2012).
174
Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 125.
175
See JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 88-90 (2010) (discussing
availability).
176
Id. at 90.
177
Id. By contrast, the capacity factor reflects the amount of actual generation of a source over time divided by a
source’s nameplate capacity. Data from the past several years show that capacity factors for fossil-fueled sources
are higher than wind and much higher than solar, once again reflecting in part the ability of the source to generate
over time. EIA, Monthly Capacity Factors for Select Fuels and Technologies, Jan. 15, 2014, at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14611. Capacity factors are also influenced by the type of load
173
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between the periods of time in which an intermittent source is available and the periods of time
in which demand for electricity is high is an important determinant of the value of a source. The
higher the correlation the more valuable the source. As would be expected, the correlation for
dispatchable resources is much higher than that for non-dispatchable resources.
Third, the usefulness of any source depends on its location. A source that is close to
major markets can be used more readily than a source that is farther from major markets, referred
to as load centers in the electricity industry. There are two ways to measure the distance between
a source and a load center. The first is to calculate the miles between a source and a load center.
Using this measure a near source is slightly more valuable than a far source because transmission
of electricity is not costless. Most of the variable cost of transmission is attributable to line
loss—electricity lost during the transmission process. That cost is modest, however, because of
the extraordinary efficiency of modern ultra-high-voltage transmission lines.178 The far more
important way of measuring the distance between a source and a load factor is by identifying and
measuring the effects of the transmission constraints that lie between the source and load centers.
A source that is five miles from the nearest load center has no value if there is no way to transmit
it from the source to a load center.179
It is difficult to identify and measure the effects of transmission constraints because
electricity is transmitted on one of three complicated and fully integrated transmission grids.180
Electricity flows in accordance with Kirchhoff’s law—the amount transmitted over any segment

that the source serves (among many other things). Base load sources, like nuclear for example, have much higher
capacity factors because they are nearly always running. See id.
178
INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION, at http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/electricitytransmission/ (Sept. 2, 2014). For general discussion, see CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 152, at 165.
179
See ISSER, supra note 118, at 107-08 (describing security-constrained economic dispatch).
180
Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 110.
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of a grid is inversely proportionational to the impedance on that segment.181 Since the quantity
of electricity from each of thousands of sources varies every second and the quantity demanded
at each of hundreds of load centers varies every second, there are hundreds of transmission
constraints on each grid with widely varying effects. If a constraint exists only five percent of
the time and it usually exists only at times of low demand, it is not important. Conversely, a
constraint that exists seventy-five percent of the time or that usually exists at times of high
demand is very important. A transmission constraint almost always increases the cost of
electricity by requiring substitution of a more expensive source for a less expensive source.182
Some of the increased cost is reflected in higher prices for electricity; some is reflected in
increased emissions of pollutants, including increased emissions of GHGs. Sometimes a
transmission constraint produces a local or regional brownout or blackout because the sources
that are accessible to a load center are not capable of generating enough electricity to
accommodate the demand at the load center.183
Each of these determinants of the usefulness and value of a source of electricity is
important. Thus, for instance, if a source has no transmission access to any load center at any
time, it is worthless. If it has access seventy-five percent of the time, but it has no access during
periods of high demand, it has little value. If a source has a twenty-five percent availability
factor and a correlation of five percent between the period of time in which it is available and the
periods of high demand, it is nearly worthless.
These complicated characteristics of electricity transmission and markets combine to
create a situation in which it is difficult to integrate intermittent sources like solar and wind into
181

See CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note [152], at 203 (describing transmission simulation programs that solve for
Kirchhoff’s equation); DOUGLAS C. GIANCOLI, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 609 – 11 (2d ed. 1989)
(setting forth Kirchhoff’s rules).
182
See Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 115 (discussing these considerations).
183
For a list of major blackouts, see CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 175, at 162.

34

Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission

a transmission grid at a reasonable cost and with tolerable adverse effects on the reliability of
electricity service. The higher the proportion of supply from intermittent sources the greater the
challenge of integration. The CPP is ambitious. It envisions a large increase in the proportion of
the total electricity supply on each grid that will be provided by intermittent sources.
There are five predominant ways in which intermittent sources can be (or are) added to a
grid at tolerable cost: storage, demand response, providing efficient backup supplies, increased
access of intermittent sources to load centers, and geographic diversification of the intermittent
sources that are accessible to each load center. Everyone agrees that electricity storage at
reasonable cost is the ideal way to integrate intermittent sources.184 The massive research and
development efforts that firms have devoted to attempts to further that goal have produced
encouraging results, but making storage economical remains a challenge.185 For now, research
and development efforts should continue to be prioritized.186
Demand response is also a promising way to ameliorate intermittency and has already
been used to this effect with some success,187 but its regulatory status is currently uncertain. The
validity of FERC’s Order 745, which set a uniform pricing scheme for demand response in the
wholesale markets, is the subject of a pending Supreme Court decision.188 If the Court holds that
FERC lacks jurisdiction to set such a scheme, it will call into question the viability of demand

184

See e.g., Amy Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, University of
Florida Levin College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 15-15 (2015).
185
See Dhruv Bhatnagar et al., SANDIA NAT’L LABS., MARKET AND POLICY BARRIERS TO ENERGY STORAGE
DEPLOYMENT 9–10 (2013).
186
Other barriers include regulatory issues, market issues in non-RTO/ISO markets, business model issues, and
technology issues. Id. at 9.
187
For an explanation of how demand response assists with integrating distributed generation, see Joel B. Eisen,
Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191
(2012).
188
Along with our co-authors, we have argued that FERC has jurisdiction to take this action. See Amicus Curiae Br.
of Energy Law Scholars in Supp. of Pet’rs, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, Nos. 14-840, 14-841 (S. Ct. filed
July 16, 2015).
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response in the capacity markets,189 which is where demand response aggregators earn most of
their revenue.190 If the prevailing business model must shift to state-level programs, significant
state regulatory changes may be necessary and will at the very least cause delay in widespread
implantation of demand response programs.191
Providing additional backup supplies is an additional means of integrating renewables. A
useful low-carbon backup source for solar and wind is hydropower, if it is operated in storage
mode—which emphasizes its value as a source of electricity and deemphasizes its value for
competing purposes like irrigation, recreation, water quality maintenance, and support of aquatic
species.192 If operated in this way, hydro is rampable; it can be turned on and off quickly just by
opening and closing control gates.193 Indeed, many European planners have already recognized
this contribution of hydro, and contemplate that hydro will become increasingly important as
renewables penetration increases.194 When the sun stops shining or the wind stops blowing,
Norway, for example, can make up for the sometimes large deficit in electricity supply that
would otherwise exist in Germany or Denmark by sending large flows of electricity from
hydropower to replace the electricity that was coming from solar and wind sources.195
Hydropower is unlikely to provide much of a solution to the integration problem in the
United States for several reasons. First, the United States has access to only modest
economically viable hydro supplies that are not already in full use for other purposes.196 Second,

189

See Am. Compl. of FirstEnergy Serv. Co., No. EL14-55-001, at 3 (FERC filed Sept. 22, 2014) (arguing EPSA
applies to PJM’s capacity markets).
190
Remarks of Greg Poulos, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, EnerNOC, Nov. 5, 2015 (notes on file with authors).
191
Id.
192
This is not the policy approach of the United States, as described infra.
193
Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 18 n.107.
194
Eurelectric, Hydro in Europe: Powering Renewables 34-39 (2011), at
http://www.eurelectric.org/media/26690/hydro_report_final-2011-160-0011-01-e.pdf.
195
Id.
196
Cf. EIA, EIA Projections show hydro growth limited by economics not resources, July 10, 2014 (distinguishing
studies suggesting greater technical capacity and noting “Because hydropower is a mature technology, most of the
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the supply of hydropower is more likely to decline rather than to increase in the United States
because dams are unpopular with the public.197 Third, the United States takes seriously the
competing uses of dams for other purposes,198 so they are not nearly as reliable a source of
backup power domestically as they are in northern Europe. Finally, hydropower’s availability is
inversely proportional to drought conditions. California’s drought, for example, is responsible
for a 9.7% decrease in hydropower generation for 2015, contributing to a nationwide decrease in
renewables generation of 2.7%.199 Some firms and government officials have recently shown
interest in building more dams in western Canada to provide the United States with access to
greatly increased supplies of hydro.200 This is a promising development, but it is far too early to
count on the success of such efforts in devising a plan to integrate intermittent sources in the U.S.
grids.201
The CPP is predicated on the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs will provide
adequate backup power at times when demand is high but intermittent sources are not available.
Indeed, natural gas is often touted as a fuel that can complement renewables’ intermittency.202
This is because natural gas-fired EGUs can ramp quickly compared to other sources, so they are

technically and economically superior sites have already been developed.”), at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17051
197
See AMERICAN RIVERS, DAMS AND HYDROPOWER,http://www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/dams/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2015) (describing efforts at dam removal).
198
See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding Federal Power Act’s
“recreational purposes” language requires agency consideration of environmental impacts); EISEN ET AL., ENERGY,
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National Environmental Policy Act . . . .”); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (holding minimum streamflows developed through state water quality certification process
were acceptable for inclusion in FERC-issed hydro permit).
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EIA, SHORT-TERM ENERGY AND WINTER FUELS OUTLOOK 14, Oct. 2015, at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.
200
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particularly useful for meeting demand when solar or wind cannot.203 Natural gas-fired EGUs
also have other characteristics that make them good candidates to provide backup power. The
price of natural gas is low at present and is predicted to remain low for the foreseeable future.
The capital cost of a natural gas-fired EGU is relatively low and the time required to obtain a
construction permit is relatively short.204
Most important for purposes of furthering the goals of the CPP, the most efficient NGCC
plants emit far less CO2 than coal, as detailed in Part I. For that reason, the CPP is predicated on
the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can be used both as a backup to the new solar and
wind supplies that are expected to reduce emissions in block 3 of the CPP and, by replacing coalfired EGUs, as the entire basis for the emissions reductions expected in block 2 of the CPP.
Thus, the success of the CPP is critically dependent on maintaining and increasing the number
and quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs at a tolerable cost.205
The assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can perform both of those functions at
tolerable cost is not well-supported. There are two obstacles to fulfilling that assumption. First,
the cost per unit of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs is likely to increase—perhaps
significantly—as a result of the major changes in the use of natural gas-fired EGUs that are
contemplated by the CPP. Traditionally, the most efficient natural gas-fired EGUs have been
used primarily as baseload supply, i.e., they generate electricity at all times except when
undergoing maintenance. The CPP is based on the assumption that over time the primary use of
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BLACK & VEATCH, COST AND PERFORMANCE DATA FOR POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 9-48 (Feb. 2012),
http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/nrel-cost-report.pdf (listing ramp rates and “quick start” rates for various
generation technologies.
204
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES
IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 1 (June 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [hereinafter EIA LCOE Estimates].
205
EPA contemplates that in the short-term at least, combustion-turbine natural gas generation will be used as
renewable support. CPP, supra note 1, at 64,716–17. These represent one-fifth of natural-gas-fired capacity, id. at
61,716, and in any event, are just as reliant on natural gas prices as NGCC.
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natural gas-fired EGUs will be as backup supplies. As electricity generated by solar and wind
increases, therefore, the quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs will
decrease.206 In other words, natural gas will compete with renewables for baseload market share.
That, in turn, will increase the cost of electricity per unit generated because the fixed costs of the
EGUs will have to be recovered in the prices charged for a lower quantity of electricity
generated.207
The second obstacle to fulfilling the assumptions underlying the CPP is related to the first,
but it is a much more serious obstacle. EPA assumes that the large increase in the amount of
electricity generated through use of natural gas-fired EGUs can be met without constructing any
new units.208 We are skeptical of that assumption. As EPA has stated in analogous contexts, its
models should not be used as an indication of what is likely to happen but only as illustrations of
what might happen.209 Under the CPP, many new natural gas-fired EGUs will have to be built to
meet the increased need for electricity generated through use of natural gas that is part of the
basis of both blocks 2 and 3 of the CPP. It will be challenging to finance those new natural gas
generators in the dramatically different circumstances in which natural gas-fired EGUs will be
used after the CPP is implemented.
Potential investors base their decisions on the flow of revenue expected as a result of an
investment. In the case of a long-lived asset like an EGU, the relevant expected flow is over the
206

At least, this is what the CPP seems to contemplate. Predictions of the future fuel mix are difficult to make even
without the regulatory uncertainty imposed by the CPP. Attempts at modeling the proposed rule’s impacts to the
generation mix resulted in projections that varied considerably. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 14–27 (2015) (providing a summary of the results from projects of the new
rule), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM5E49DK]; Michael Wara et al., Peak Electricity and the Clean Power Plan, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 24–25 (2015)
(providing several predictions for electricity).
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operating in wholesale markets; their short-run marginal costs are quite low, but their long-run-average costs are not
compensated by the market because of various distortions. See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 119
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CPP, supra note 1, at 64,802.
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EPA Resp. in Opp’n, No. 15-1277, Doc. No. 1570665, at 29 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 31, 2015).
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expected life of the asset—thirty to forty years in the case of an EGU.210 The revenue flow
expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU in the conditions created by the CPP
will be much lower than the flow expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU that is
used as a baseload source.211 Once natural gas-fired EGUs are used primarily as backups for
wind and power, the expected revenue flow will be lower, and it will decline over time as the
quantity of electricity expected to be generated from solar and wind increases.212
Moreover, the CPP may cause prospective investors to view investments in new natural
gas-fired EGUs as high-risk. Since the purpose of the CPP is to reduce emissions of GHGs, and
natural gas-fired EGUs emit large quantities of GHGs, prospective investors will be concerned
that the CPP is only step one in the effort to reduce emissions of GHGs. Indeed, others have
identified this issue as a policy imperative.213 The most logical step two would be a program to
replace natural gas-fired EGUs with carbon-free sources. Thus, prospective investors will attach
a high degree of uncertainty to the revenue flows they expect from an investment in a new EGU
over the expected life of the EGU.
Low, declining, and uncertain expected revenue flows discourage investors. It is not at
all clear that the conditions created by the CPP will be consistent with the investments in new
natural gas-fired EGUs that we believe to be critical to the success of the CPP. If the market
conditions do not produce enough investment, it is far from certain that the government will be
willing to subsidize investments in new natural gas-fired EGUs, knowing that they are a
significant source of GHG emissions. If enough new natural gas-fired EGUs can be financed in
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See generally EIA LCOE ESTIMATES (describing these considerations).
A commentator to the proposed CPP argued that redirecting natural gas to supporting renewables calls into
question EPA’s anticipated 75% utilization rate of existing NGCC. CPP, supra note 1, at 64,803.
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See id.
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See MIT, The Future of Natural Gas 9 (2010) (arguing higher GHG emission targets could “require the complete
de-carbonization of the power sector”).
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the conditions created by the CPP, the cost of the capital required to make those investments will
be high, given the low, declining, and risky expected flow of revenues. That, coupled with the
increased unit cost caused by the reductions in output of natural gas-fired EGUs, will make the
critical gas components of the CPP costly.
The third way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with
tolerable decreases in the reliability of electricity service is by maximizing the access of wind
and power sources to major load centers. Many of the most desirable locations for wind farms
and solar EGUs are remote from major load centers. Thus, for instance, the plains states have
the kind of relatively high and constant wind velocity that make them particularly attractive
locations for wind farms, while the deserts in the southwestern states have conditions that make
them particularly attractive locations for solar EGUs.214 Both are far from major load centers,
however.
The most desirable locations for wind and solar can be exploited only if they are
connected to major load centers with new ultra-high voltage transmission lines. Professors
Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have explained in detail why that outcome is unlikely to
happen in a timely manner without a major change in law.215 Most other important parts of the
energy infrastructure, like gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) plants, can begin
construction as soon as they receive authorization from a federal agency.216 The process of
obtaining that authorization takes an average of less than two years.217

214

Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A
Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1832-47 (2012).
215
Id. at 1858-73.
216
See Alexandra Klass, Future-proofing Energy Transport Law, at 20 (2015) (describing relative ease of
authorizing this infrastructure) (draft on file with authors).
217
Id. at 35.

41

Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission

But transmission lines can be constructed only if they are authorized by state, and
sometimes even local, governments.218 The process of obtaining that authorization routinely
takes a decade, often takes far longer, and sometimes proves to be impossible.219 The source of
this problem is a mismatch between the geographic scope of the costs and benefits of
transmission lines. A new transmission line usually produces some aesthetic harm and few
benefits in the state that must authorize it. That state may come to the conclusion that the costs
of the line to the state's residents exceed its benefits to the residents. It may then decide not to
authorize construction of the line or, at least not to expedite the process of deciding whether to
authorize the line.
Viewed from a national perspective, however, the benefits of the line may be much
greater than its costs. If a federal agency had the power to decide whether to authorize the line, it
could make a quick affirmative decision. Given the importance to the success of the CPP of
providing access to markets for solar EGUs and wind farms, a federal agency with the power to
authorize construction of a transmission line would be able to match the two-year average time it
now takes Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to authorize construction of a gas
pipeline or LNG plant.220
The final way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with a
tolerable decrease in the reliability of electricity service is through geographic diversification of
sources. A respected consulting firm has issued a report in which it concluded that the problem
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of integrating intermittent sources can be solved through geographic diversification of sources.221
That conclusion seems plausible. If a large number of wind and solar generators are connected
in different locations, grid operators can maximize the probability that power will be available
from some combination of intermittent sources at all times. When the wind decreases in one
area, it is likely to increase in other areas, and a cloudy day in the location of some solar sources
is likely to be offset by sunshine in the location of other sources or by healthy wind velocity in
locations with wind farms. Denmark has made good use of this strategy: the key to its success
has been the existence of a robust transmission grid.222
The United States is severely limited in its ability to use geographic diversification of
sources as a means of integrating intermittent sources. In most locations, the regional grids lack
the capacity to transmit significant quantities of electricity generated from locations with
differing weather conditions to load centers.223 To engage in effective geographic diversification
of sources, the United States would have to strengthen the grids substantially by constructing
many new transmission lines in a timely manner. That is impossible with our current allocation
of permitting authority to state governments.
Absent some unexpected dramatic improvement in the ability to store electricity at
tolerable cost or rapidly construct major transmission lines, integrating substantial intermittent
sources as contemplated by the CPP will be difficult and expensive. It will be difficult, if not
impossible, to accomplish that task successfully without a change in the allocation of power to
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Patrick Luckow, Tommy Vitolo & Joseph Daniel, Synapse Energy Economics, A Solved Problem: Existing
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authorize construction of transmission lines. If states retain that power, it is hard to imagine how
the CPP can succeed. It follows that the two most important steps the United States must take to
implement the CPP are continued aggressive research and development efforts to identify less
expensive ways of storing electricity, and switching the power to authorize construction of a
transmission line from state governments to the federal government.
B.

The Interaction of Preemption Doctrine and State Electricity Regulation

As states consider how to implement the section 111(d) standards, they must also
confront the many barriers stemming from our constitutional structure. For example, the
dormant Commerce Clause limits their options in designing renewable-portfolio or low-carbon
fuel standards.224 The Supremacy Clause also limits state options, particularly with respect to the
preemptive reach of the CAA,225 FPA,226 and Atomic Energy Act.227 An issue that has attracted
little attention,228 however, concerns the interplay between a state’s restructuring status and
preemption doctrine. Recent preemption litigation involving the FPA suggests that a state’s
status matters for how it can comply with the CPP.
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E.g., N.D. v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014), appeal filed, No. 14-2156 (8th Cir. filed May 19,
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The relevant cases involve Maryland and New Jersey, which are restructured states
operating in the PJM Interconnection. Both determined in the early 2000s that the PJM capacity
market was not incentivizing sufficient investment in new electricity generation.229 New
Jersey’s legislature, for example, expressly found that the capacity market had “not resulted in
large additions of peaking facilities or any additions of intermediate or base load resources
available to the region and the State.”230 The two states passed statutes that would subsidize new
natural gas construction within their borders. Both accomplished this goal by assuring new
generation a fixed revenue stream for supplying electrical capacity that cleared the PJM capacity
market.231 Several existing electricity generators challenged the statutes, arguing they were
preempted by the FPA.
Both the Third and Fourth Circuits held that field preemption forbade the statutes because
the wholesale markets are within FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit decision in
particular emphasized that by restructuring, Maryland had “throw[n] in its lot with the federal
interstate markets” and thereby compelled electricity generators within its borders to sell
electricity in the wholesale market.232 Having done so, the state could not then regulate how its
generators interacted with that market—notwithstanding the states’ traditional authority over
electricity siting and construction.233 The subsidy, reasoned the court, attempted to directly
regulate capacity market prices by setting the price that generators would receive for capacity.234
This the state could not do.
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These holdings are notable for two interrelated reasons. First, the markets themselves are
frequently criticized for failing to incentivize new construction because they are based on shortrun marginal costs but often include price caps.235 Capacity markets are one response; ERCOT’s
very high price caps are another.236 Despite these modifications to the wholesale markets,
commentators continue to express concern that there are inadequate incentives for investors.237
As described above, moreover, the CPP may heighten these concerns for natural gas.238
But to the extent states would step in to incentivize new capacity as part of their CPP
compliance, the capacity cases show the options are limited. Indeed, the second reason to pay
attention to these cases is that they show how restructured states may have less flexibility than
their traditionally regulated counterparts. Compare, for example, Georgia and South Carolina,
which are traditionally regulated states with vertically integrated utilities whose wholesale sales
do not take place on spot markets. These states have incentivized new nuclear construction—
which will count toward CPP compliance—by guaranteeing that the utilities can recover the
carrying costs of construction through their rates.239 The capacity market issue is irrelevant in
this context because these states have not disaggregated electricity generation from supply.
Instead, the states are free to determine that new capacity is needed and to incentivize new
construction through the rates they authorize.
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And what of traditionally regulated states whose generators operate in a Regional
Transmission Organization (“RTO”) or Independent System Operator (“ISO”) market?240 The
logic of the capacity cases suggests that these states too are foreclosed from approaches like
those Maryland and New Jersey took. And states that are traditionally regulated but in which
generation resources operate in any RTO/ISOs or power pool241 face additional complexity. To
be sure, the capacity cases noted that options like direct subsidies and tax rebates242 might avoid
preemption concerns; these may be available under state law irrespective of restructuring status.
Our point is not that states are left with no options. It is that those options are both variable and
dependent on restructuring status. EPA glosses over state complexity by falling back on
flexibility and the grid’s resiliency, but in doing so it fails to anticipate the ramifications of states’
restructuring decisions for CPP compliance.
IV.

Conclusion
We end where we began. We support the CPP but we are concerned about the effects of

some of the difficult legal issues it presents and some of the difficult implementation issues it
presents. We cannot resist making one more point. It would be easy to accomplish all of the
goals of the CPP more efficiently and effectively, with much lower transactions costs and much
lower potential unintended adverse effects by taking just two steps. If the United States were to
enact a carbon tax243 and switch to real-time pricing of electricity,244 then the United States could
realistically expect that market forces would do the rest of the job.
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regulatory fluctuation—an ill we have identified herein with respect to administrative law doctrine. E.g., EISEN ET
AL., supra note [199], at 784-85 (“The [production tax credit’s] record is a sad story of ‘Same Time, Next Year.’”).
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